Labor Law--Arbitration of Safety Disputes by DiPiero, J. Timothy
Volume 76 | Issue 2 Article 12
February 1974
Labor Law--Arbitration of Safety Disputes
J. Timothy DiPiero
West Virginia University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. T. DiPiero, Labor Law--Arbitration of Safety Disputes, 76 W. Va. L. Rev. (1974).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss2/12
LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION OF SAFETY
DISPUTES
No one in law is going to sit on their cans in Washington
and tell members of the UMW that they have to work in unsafe
conditions while arbitration is going on.'
After a sharp reduction in the air flow of a coal mine owned
by Gateway Coal Company was discovered and corrected, an in-
vestigation of the safety hazard revealed that certain assistant
foremen had falsified air intake measurement records prior to the
discovery of the hazard. The foremen were suspended, but, while
criminal charges were pending against them, they were reinstated
by the company after permission to do so was given by the Penn-.
'sylvania Department of Mines.
At this point, members of the local union walked off the job
in protest of the reinstatement. The union refused an offer by the
employer to arbitrate. The company responded to this refusal by
seeking relief in federal district court under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act,2 claiming that their conflict
was governed by the broad arbitration clause of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.3 The district court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion ordering the miners to return to work and submit the dispute
to arbitration. The court also ordered the foremen suspended until
the arbitrator reached a decision. The arbitrator then ruled that
the foremen could return to work, since their presence created no
abnormally dangerous conditions for the miners. Meanwhile, the
union appealed the district court's finding to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, which reversed and vacated the injunction on
the ground that the union had no contractual obligation to submit
a safety dispute to arbitration, and, consequently, there was no
'Arnold Miller, President of the United Mine Workers, in response to the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Work-
ers, 42 U.S.L.W. 4095 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1974). Charleston Gazette, Jan. 14, 1974, § A,
at 1, col. 3. Arnold Miller made these remarks to a meeting of District 17 miners in
Charleston, West Virginia. He also promised them that "any new contract will not
be drawn up in 'legal lingo' . . . but in language miners can understand."
229 U.S.C. § 185 (1971).
'The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968 was in effect. The
walkout occurred in April, 1971. Therefore, the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1971 did not apply since it did not become effective until November
12, 1971. Unlike the 1968 agreement, the 1971 agreement provides for the settlement
of safety and health disputes by a detailed procedure that ultimately parallels
arbitration. National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971 art. III, § (h).
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implied duty not to strike. The company appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The federal policy favoring
arbitration extends to safety disputes. The arbitration provision of
the labor contract involved covered the instant dispute, and the
duty to arbitrate gave rise to an implied no-strike clause that
would support the issuance of an injunction. The Court also held
that section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act was not applicable to the
facts of the case. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 42
U.S.L.W. 4095 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1974).
The Supreme Court's decision involved the interpretation and
application of various pertinent sources of law including past Su-
preme Court decisions, the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1968, section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,i
and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.6 The
first, and most basic, question presented in Gateway is whether
safety disputes are subject to compulsory arbitration under the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968 or whether
they should be treated as sui generis. Justice Powell, who deliv-
ered the majority opinion, clearly explained "that the 'presump-
tion of arbitrability' announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy, ap-
plies to safety disputes, and that the dispute in the instant case is
covered by the arbitration clause in the parties' collective bargain-
ing agreement."9 On the issue of the district court's authority to
enjoin the miners' walkout, the Court noted that "[tihe answer
'Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972). A
detailed analysis of this controversy prior to the Supreme Court's decision, as well
as a general treatment of safety disputes, is contained in Note, Walkouts Under
Section 502 of The Taft-Hartley Act, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 57 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Walkouts].
529 U.S.C. § 143 (1971).
'30 U.S.C. § 801 (1971).
1466 F.2d at 1159. The Third Circuit used this term to distinguish safety dis-
putes from all other labor disputes, and, thus, exempt them from binding arbitra-
tion.
The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of thre6'Supreme Court decisions: United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In Warrior & Gulf, the Court
held that "[aln order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage." 363 U.S. at 582-83. Thus, adopting this reasoning, if
it is at all possible to construe the arbitration clause to apply to safety disputes,
then it should be so interpreted.
142 U.S.L.W. at 4099.
[Vol. 76
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depends on whether the union was under a contractual duty not
to strike."'I Although there was no express obligation not to strike,
as in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,11 the Court
used the reasoning in Boys Markets2 and the holding in Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.' 3 to conclude that, absent an express
intention to the contrary, "the agreement to arbitrate and the duty
not to strike should be construed as having coterminous applica-
tion.""
The final issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether
the circumstances of the case satisfied the traditional equitable
considerations controlling the availability of injunctive relief. The
Court reviewed the Third Circuit's decision denying the company
injunctive relief because of section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
which provides in part: "[N]or shall the quitting of labor by an
employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dan-
gerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such
employee or employees be deemed a strike under this chapter."'"
The Court rejected the Third Circuit's majority opinion which
called for the invocation of section 502 protection for any "good
faith apprehension of physical danger.""' Expressing its agreement
with the dissenting opinion in the Third Circuit litigation, the
Court explained that an honest belief alone is not sufficient. The
union is required to submit "ascertainable, objective evidence sup-
porting its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for
work exists."' 7 The Court pointed out that here the alleged safety
Md.
"398 U.S. 235 (1970).
'"This reasoning is reflected in the Court's language: "Any incentive for em-
ployers to enter into such an arrangement [to submit grievances to arbitration] is
necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which the
no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated." Id. at 248. The Court overruled
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), which held that, despite a
contract providing for binding arbitration, section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1971), bars a federal district court from enjoining a strike in
breach of a no-strike provision in the collective bargaining agreement. Instead, it
held that the granting of injunctive relief is not barred by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act where the dispute is subject to arbitration and the union's violation of its no-
strike clause is causing the employer irreparable harm.
'369 U.S. 95 (1962). In an action for damages, the Court found that an agree-
ment to submit disputes to binding arbitration implied a duty not to walk out over
such disagreements.
"42 U.S.L.W. at 4100.
'129 U.S.C. § 143 (1971).
"1466 F.2d at 1160.
742 U.S.L.W. at 4101, quoting from 466 F.2d at 1162.
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hazard was eliminated by the district court's suspension of the
foremen pending arbitration. As the district court had done, the
Supreme Court warned that the miners' continual breach of the
union's no-strike obligation would result in irreparable damage to
the company. 8
In reaching its decision that compulsory arbitration applies to
safety disputes, the Court first analyzed the collective bargaining
agreement and cited substantial case law supporting its conclu-
sion. Then, to give the legal reasoning some common sense credi-
bility, Justice Powell interposed the impracticality of the Third
Circuit's decision. Without arbitration of safety disputes, work
stoppages would result in the "unhappy consequences of lost pay,
curtailed production, and economic instability."'8 Similarly, in
defending the district court's issuance of the injunction, the Court
began by applying the Boys Markets case to the present facts and
examining section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Next, the Court
stressed the "common sense 20 in its finding. It emphasized the
unfairness and impracticality in a policy which permits miners to
strike anytime they honestly doubt their supervisors' integrity and
skill without requiring some proof that an abnormal danger exists.
Seven judges joined Justice Powell in the majority opinion of the
Court, while Justice Douglas dissented.
The dissent is interesting because of the opposite approach
Justice Douglas took in reaching his conclusion. Lacking strong
precedent to support his view, he prefaced his attack on the appli-
cation of arbitration to safety disputes with candid down-to-earth
language: "The dispute in this labor case does not involve hourly
wages, pension benefits, or the like. It involves the life and death
of the workers in the most dangerous occupation in America. ' 2'
Thus, Justice Douglas began with an expanded setting, not of a
narrow-question of labor contract interpretation, but of a serious
problem in modem society-the continuing neglect for the health
and safety of thousands of mineworkers. Judge Hastie, who deliv-
ered the majority opinion of the Third:Circuit, shared this perspec-
tive of the mine safety controversy: "Men are not wont to submit
matters of life or death to arbitration and no enlightened society
encourages, much less requires, them to do so. ' '21 Certainly, the
"142 U.S.L.W. at 4101.
"Id. at 4099.
"Id. at 4101.21 d. at 4101 (dissenting opinion).
21466 F.2d at 1160.
[Vol. 76
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merits in this argument should not be readily dismissed. Regard-
less of its inattention to labor law principles, or its potential harm
to a company's profits, or even its failure to recognize possible
ulterior motives of employees for striking, the policy of the law, as
noted by Judge Hastie and Justice Douglas, should not require
employees to stake their lives on the judgment of an arbitrator.23
The actual and potential perils involved in underground mining
are common knowledge in this country, particularly so in West
Virginia. On this level, therefore, one can understand Arnold
Miller's bitter reaction to the Gateway decision.
Upon this common sense basis of social awareness, Justice
Douglas constructed his legal theories. First, he inferred, from a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement and the explicit
protection afforded by section 502, that the Steelworkers Trilogy's
presumption of arbitration is not applicable to safety disputes.24
Secondly, he asserted that, even if the agreement is construed to
authorize arlitration, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969 "precludes it."
While the first contention regarding the presumption of arbi-
tration is simply a negation of he majority's view of the law, the
second contention is a positive alternative to the majority position
and should be closely examined. True, the 1969 Act states in its
preamble that "(a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal
mining industry must be the health and safety of its most precious
resource-the miner."" And, as Justice Douglas pointed out, the
1969 Act contains numerous safety provisions including federal
inspections, spot investigations, detailed ventilating requirements,
and penalties for violations of certain mandatory safety standards.
Yet, does it really provide for the nullification of arbitration in
situations involving safety disputes? Justice Douglas reasoned that
the Act "must displace all agreements to arbitrate safety condi-
tions," because, in the area of mine safety, "Congress has
preempted the field.27 The majority rejected this argument by stat-
ing that not only did the UMW not contend this, but "a fair read-
ing of the Act discloses no congressional intention, either express
or implied, to accomplish such a drastic result."28 Douglas himself
=Id.
242 U.S.L.W. at 4102 (dissenting opinion).
rId. at 4103 (dissenting opinion).
130 U.S.C. § 801 (1969).
"42 U.S.L.W. at 4103 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 4099 n.10.
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acknowledged that this view is "more extreme" 9 than the holding
in United States Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles,3" in which arbitration
was found not to abrogate a federal statute giving seamen an ex-
press judicial remedy. As Justice Douglas viewed it, a safety con-
troversy is a special problem that should be handled by the secre-
tary of the interior and the courts as the 1969 Act specifies. He
concluded his opinion by reiterating that "Congress has given arbi-
ters no share of the power."' 1
Whether a federal pre-emption of all contract clauses author-
izing arbitration of safety disputes would be feasible is uncertain.
To examine the 1969 Act's many provisions seems unnecessary,
since the holding in Gateway strongly opposes such a view. The
majority opinion gave systematic and fairly comprehensive legal
justifications for its position. The ultimate test of the decision,
however, will be the acceptability to the miner of arbitrating safety
disputes. This, in turn, logically depends on the speed and fairness
of the arbitration process. Gateway does not weaken section 502 of
the Taft-Hartley Act as it has been traditionally applied. Employ-
ees may still refuse to work in abnormally dangerous conditions,
so long as they can quickly prove the conditions are just that.
Furthermore, labor organizations may still bargain for contractual
clauses that provide for re-assignment from areas alleged to be
abnormally dangerous and "that require speedy but knowledge-
able determination of their insistence that working conditions are
dangerous without any penalty for being wrong. '32
Finally, Justice Douglas' dissent need not be completely ig-
nored. Providing that speedy inspections are conducted under the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, a federal inspec-
tor's determination of the existence of a safety hazard should be
extremely influential, if not binding, on an arbitrator. Also, re-
peated utilization of the contractual grievance machinery by em-
ployees because of safety complaints, coupled with citations by
inspectors under the 1969 Act, should convince an otherwise recal-
citrant employer to extensively renovate unsafe areas on the job
site.
J. Timothy DiPiero
2Id. at 4103 (dissenting opinion).
20400 U.S. 351 (1971).
1142 U.S.L.W. at 4103 (dissenting opinion).
'2Walkouts, supra note 4, at 71.
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